Are You Certain In Your Skills? Self Evaluations and Responses to Ambiguous Feedback by O'Donnell-Davidson, Danaan James
  
Are You Certain In Your Skills? 
Self-Evaluations and Responses to Ambiguous Feedback 
 
 
 
 
By  
Danaan J. O’Donnell-Davidson 
 
 
 
A Thesis  
 
 
 
 
 
Presented to the Department of Psychology  
and the Robert D. Clark Honors College  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Bachelor of Science at the University of Oregon 
  
February 2014 
An Abstract of the Thesis of 
Danaan James O'Donneii-Davidson for the degree of 
Bachelor of Science in the Department of Psychology for March 2013 
Title: Are You Certain In Your Skills? 
Self Evaluations and Responses to Ambiguous Feedback 
Approved:~ ~.,. ... __ _ 
~
Professor Sara Hodges 
The STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) have 
been historically male dominated, and continue to be so today. The reasons for this are 
numerous and complex. This study focuses on the role that self-perceptions of ability 
play in interpreting ambiguous feedback. 
Participants consisted of 508 psychology and linguistic students recruited from 
the University of Oregon. Everyone learned about a •·new dimension of human 
cognitive performance" called Integrational Complexity. Those in an "excel" condition 
were told that they should do well at IC, and those in an "uncertain" condition were told 
that their performance ''on IC tasks is more uncertain and variable." 
Participants completed an "Integrational Complexity Skills Assessment." All 
participants. including those in the control condition, were then informed that their IC 
skills were in the average range. They continued to another survey that gauged their 
feelings towards IC. We hypothesized that participants made to feel uncertain about 
their skills in IC would have more negative feelings towards the domain than either the 
control group or the excel group. 
Participants' scores for the self-perception measure (F(2,438)=3.96, p =0.02) 
confirmed our hypothesis. We found an etTect for gender as well, such that men 
reported significantly more positive self-perceptions with regards to IC than did women 
(F(1,439)=34.44,p<0.001). We also found that women felt their scores to be more 
accurate than did men (F(1,439)= 9.64, p= 0.002). 
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Self-Evaluations and Responses to Ambiguous Feedback 
 
Introduction 
 Have you ever entered a classroom and wondered, "Am I any good at this 
subject?" This situation can happen to anyone, and the potential reasons for its 
occurrence are many, but certain people will experience these kinds of doubts more 
often than others. This frequency is in part predicted by demographic characteristics of 
the individual as well as what field of work/study the individual occupies. For example, 
imagine you are a woman in one of the STEM fields (science, technology, engineering 
and math). Most of your peers, teachers, and cited authors/researchers are male. This 
atmosphere may prompt you to ask, “Why are there so few women here?” which could 
lead to, “Are women bad at STEM?” and finally, “Am I bad at STEM?”  
What makes STEM fields different from other fields? For one, the fields of 
science, engineering, technology and math have been historically male dominated, and 
continue to be so today (Blickenstaff, 2005). These fields are slow to gender equalize; 
the only ones that seem to have come close so far are medicine and the life sciences, 
and even these, at upper levels of management and academics, continue to be 
overwhelmingly male (Beede et al., 2010; Bickel et al., 2002). The reasons for this are 
many.  
One reason is that some people still believe the long standing stereotype that 
women are biologically worse than men at the kind of thinking necessary in STEM 
fields (Steele, 1997), despite ample evidence to the contrary (Spelke, 2005). A meta-
analysis from 2010 concluded that there was no gender difference in recent studies of 
mathematic performance (Lindberg, Hyde, Petersen, & Linn 2010). In 2005, Lawrence 
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Summers, at the time the president of Harvard University, suggested that the lack of 
women in STEM was due to inherent sex differences (Steele & Ambady, 2006; Zhang, 
Schmader & Forbes, 2009). Imagine the effects that statement could have on females in 
STEM, especially those attending Harvard! Even if a woman does not believe the 
stereotype, the mere fact that it exists can have powerful influences on her desire to 
remain in the field. For instance, it was shown that simply changing the décor of 
computer science classrooms from Star Trek posters and videogames to nature posters 
and phone books increased the interest of female undergraduates in computer science 
(Cheryan, Plaut, Davies, & Steele, 2009). The classic decorations in computer science 
classrooms broadcast a masculine stereotype, which discourages women from entering 
the field. 
Besides the issues of stereotypes and male-oriented décor, STEM fields contain 
relatively few women professors, and hence fail to provide role models within the 
gender (Stout, Dasgupta, Hunsinger & McManus, 2011). Having role models who 
possess the same characteristics (gender, ethnicity, etc.) shows students and employees 
through concrete examples that they can reach the same levels of achievement as their 
role model (Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004; Dee, 2001). Female role models can help 
counteract negative stereotypes because they provide salient proof that women possess 
the same skills as men and can succeed within the field. Right now, this proof remains 
elusive to many women starting out in STEM fields because these fields consist 
primarily of men, both in terms of students and faculty (NSF, 2011). Even in 
circumstances of gender equity by number, labs usually have a male primary 
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investigator—communicating that women may be somewhat welcome, but only men 
have what it takes to climb to the top of the ladder. 
Even in situations with female professors, female students can face disparate 
treatment. Both male and female professors may treat their female students differently 
than their male students, and—consciously or not—treat their work differently as well 
(Gunderson, 2012). Teacher’s attitudes strongly influence the views that students have 
of their abilities. Hence, if a teacher expects less from students, then the students 
oftentimes expect less from themselves. This is especially true if their teachers hold a 
fixed (innate) theory of math intelligence (Rattan, Good, & Dweck, 2012). If female 
students then receive lower grades (or assume their grades to be lower) on tests than 
their male counterparts, they could attribute it to their own shortcomings.  
This possibility is strengthened since women tend to underestimate their 
performance on societally classified “masculine” tasks (Beyer, 1998). A study found 
that even when women performed as well as men on a science quiz, they assumed they 
performed worse because they believed they had worse scientific reasoning than men. 
Consequently, when asked to enter a science competition, they were more likely to 
refuse (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003). Women also attribute perceived poor performance 
to a lack of underlying ability with greater frequency than men (Felder, Felder, Mauney, 
Hamrin & Dietz, 1995). Taken together, this means that women may misjudge their 
level of performance as poor and attribute it to a lack of underlying ability, when in 
reality they could be performing as well—or even better—than male peers in the field. 
What are the consequences of this compromising atmosphere? 
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To start, for those that begin to doubt their abilities, self-doubt predicts self-
defeating cognitive, emotional, and behavioral outcomes in the achievement realm. 
When people doubt their self-competence, they are more likely to self-handicap and 
attribute success to luck. This in turn may lead to further self-doubt (Braslow, 
Guerrettaz, Arkin, & Oleson, 2012). Importantly, in STEM fields, the choice to pursue a 
vocation is mediated by beliefs in one’s ability (Hackett, 1985). Lent and colleagues 
found that self-efficacy predicted grades, persistence, and the range of perceived 
options in STEM fields (Lent, Brown, & Larkin 1986; Multon, Brown, & Lent 1991). 
People who think they have strong STEM abilities remain within their field, and those 
who do not tend to change their focus (Zhang, et al., 2009).  
It is important to understand how these types of self-perceptions form because 
perception of performance is a better predictor of future interest than actual 
performance (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003). In fact, actual performance does not even 
necessarily predict self-ratings of abilities, especially for children (Dweck, 1986). How 
a person thinks she will perform predicts self-ratings of performance (Beyer & Bowden, 
1997). When individuals are told that they have high ability in a domain, they predict 
that they will do better on future performances within the domain than those who have 
been given less positive feedback regarding their domain specific abilities (Stangor, 
Carr & Kiang, 1998). However, factors such as stereotypes (Bornholt, 2000; Stangor et 
al., 1998) and social contexts (Walton & Cohen, 2007) that favor men in certain 
domains—such as STEM fields—influence these expectancies. All this taken together 
suggests that if STEM students initially doubt their abilities, even positive performance 
may not change their view of self-competence, and these view will likely lead to 
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discontinuation within the field. However, if people expect to perform well in STEM, 
they will continue to rate their performance positively regardless of actual performance, 
and they will be more likely to remain within the field. At the same time, current 
stereotypes and social contexts likely prevent women from holding these positive 
expectancies to a comparable degree to men’s.  
 In short, historical discrimination along with female underrepresentation in 
STEM fields has created a situation in which women may interpret feedback differently 
than their male peers. However, it is unclear whether this process is unique to women in 
STEM fields, or rather if anyone made uncertain about his or her abilities in a particular 
field might interpret feedback in a less positive light than his or her peers. Pushing this 
question further, is the discrimination and underrepresentation that women have 
experienced in STEM even necessary to create a context in which individuals interpret 
feedback negatively? 
We designed the current study to examine how feelings of uncertainty about 
abilities within a given domain affect opinions towards said domain and self-
perceptions of one’s ability in a given domain in the face of ambiguous feedback. In this 
way our work furthers research exploring the experiences of women in STEM fields 
and how those experiences affect the gender imbalance in STEM. However, we set out 
to test whether similar processes might apply to any domain or situation that has created 
a context in which individuals question their abilities and then receive ambiguous 
feedback. 
We chose to examine responses to ambiguous feedback specifically because 
ambiguous feedback is more easily misinterpreted than other forms of feedback. While 
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most people tend to perform in the average range (feedback that indicates an average 
performance is ambiguous because it does not clearly suggest a positive or negative 
performance), not all people respond to this performance similarly. For example, 
depressed individuals are more likely to interpret ambiguous feedback more negatively 
than non-depressed individuals (Dykman, Abramson, Alloy, & Hartlage, 1989). 
Additionally, the circumstance of receiving ambiguous feedback could differ 
from that of receiving other feedback types. In the case of ambiguity, outside influences 
(e.g., stereotypes) can more easily skew recipients’ interpretations of their level of 
achievement (Dykman et al., 1989). Vulnerable populations, who are already at risk of 
negative interpretation of the feedback they receive, have this hazard compounded when 
the feedback is of an ambiguous nature. A student, if given an “A” on a test, will know 
he or she performed well almost regardless of the situation, but when given a “B,” that 
same student may now question his or her abilities. 
The current study examines how feelings of uncertainty towards ability in a 
given domain will affect the interpretation of ambiguous feedback within the domain. 
We created a fictional domain (“integrational complexity”) to ensure no pre-existing 
stereotypes can influence these results. Based on previous research (Beyer & Bowden, 
1997), men may report higher scores on self-perception of ability measures than 
women, but gender is not expected to moderate the effects of manipulating uncertainty, 
described in more detail below.   
Setting overall gender differences aside, the main purpose of this study is to find 
out whether anyone, when made to feel uncertain about his or her skills in a given 
domain and then provided with ambiguous feedback, will have more negative feelings 
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towards the domain in terms of self-perceptions, future interest, perceptions of the 
domain, and perceptions of feedback. If uncertainty affects men and women alike, this 
suggests that women’s underrepresentation in STEM is not due to innate ability 
differences, but instead a normal response to uncertainty that is created for them in male 
dominated/oriented fields. 
To test this we assigned participants to one of three conditions where their 
performance expectations in a novel domain were manipulated (uncertain expectation, 
control (no expectation), or expectation to excel). Everyone received the same 
ambiguous results and we then measured participants’ self-perceptions and feelings 
towards the fabricated domain. We hypothesize that participants made to feel uncertain 
about their skills in a given domain would have more negative feelings towards the 
domain than either a control group or a group told that they would likely excel. We 
included a control condition (where no performance expectancies were introduced) in 
order to better understand whether uncertainty hurts self-perceptions or rather if 
expecting to excel boosts self-perceptions. We hypothesize that both will be the case. 
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 508 psychology and linguistic students recruited from the human 
subjects pool at the University of Oregon participated in this study for class research 
credit. Due to the online nature of the experiment, students could participate in the study 
at any time and place, at a computer of their choosing. Out of the 508 total participants, 
73.6% were female and 26.4% male. Ages ranged from 18 to 43 (M=19.63, SD=2.53); 
most participants were white (72.9%) and native English speakers (92.9%). Data were 
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excluded from 57 individuals for failure to pass the manipulation check (i.e., they could 
not identify what condition they had been assigned to), 6 individuals who expressed 
suspicion (discussed below), and another 5 individuals who did not complete the study, 
leaving a total sample of 440 individuals.  
Procedure 
After reading an informed consent page and completing a basic demographic 
survey, participants were brought to a screen on the computer explaining the purpose of 
the study. Participants were told that the study was about “a new dimension of human 
cognitive performance” that has gained psychologists’ interests as electronic and online 
communication has increased. From this point on, all information given to the students 
about this “cognitive dimension” was fictitious. This deception created an opportunity 
for participants to form feelings towards a domain they had never previously 
encountered, thus ensuring they had no preconceived notions regarding how they would 
perform or whether they would belong. The cognitive dimension was called 
Integrational Complexity (IC for short). Participants read that IC skills were important 
for multitasking and electronic media skills and that IC skills were associated with 
college success. After reading the description of IC, the procedure diverged for the 
experimental and control conditions. In the control condition, participants continued 
straight from the description of the domain of IC to the “Integrational Complexity Skills 
Assessment” (described below).  
In the experimental conditions, prior to the skills assessment, participants’ 
expectations for how they would perform on the assessment were manipulated. 
Participants in the experimental conditions were told that when they first signed up to 
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be a part of the human subjects pool, among the background measures they initially 
completed were measures that could predict how they would perform on tests requiring 
IC skills. They were also told that previous research using these measures had identified 
two types of cognitive profiles: “Group C,” who tend to perform well on IC tasks, and 
“Group X,” whose performance “on IC tasks is more uncertain and variable.” 
Participants were told that because they had already filled out the general survey, their 
cognitive profiles could be calculated to see which group they were in. After clicking to 
continue, a “loading” screen appeared in order to give the impression that their profile 
was actually being computed. At this point participants in the experimental condition 
were randomly assigned to one of the two IC groups (i.e., Group C or Group X) and 
reminded of what that profile meant for IC performance (i.e., tendency to excel or 
uncertain performance). Participants in the control condition were not told anything 
about a preliminary measure that predicted their IC skills; nor were they told anything 
about the two IC groups. After receiving the cognitive profile information, participants 
were told that “To help us learn more about how this cognitive profile is related to IC, 
next you will take a test of your IC skills.”  
Participants in all conditions completed the bogus “Integrational Complexity 
Skills Assessment.” This assessment consisted of 21 questions that were designed to 
have no obvious correct answers so that participants would be unsure of how they were 
performing. Some of the questions asked for the participant to make a comparison 
judgment between two pictures (e.g., participants were shown pictures of two different 
renderings of trains in motion and asked “Which train appears to be moving faster to 
you?”). Other questions asked for the participant’s opinion on an optical illusion (e.g., 
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participants were shown a picture of a spinning dancer and asked, “Which direction 
does the dancer appear to be spinning?”). 
 After they finished the IC assessment, participants waited while the computer 
ostensibly processed their results. All participants received the same feedback 
regardless of condition. They were shown a graph that displayed the distribution of IC 
skills in the general population with three areas labeled: low competency, average, and 
high competency (see figure in the Appendix). The participant’s score was marked as a 
red line in the center of the graph—clearly a very average score—and they were told 
that: 
Your Integrational Complexity skills are in the average range. Because they are 
not in the high competency range at this point, many Integrational Complexity 
tasks would challenge you, but your performance suggests that with training and 
practice, you could improve substantially at Integrational Complexity. 
 
After receiving feedback on their performance participants were told that they would 
answer questions about their experiences and the feedback they received.  
Measures 
As a manipulation check, first participants were asked which cognitive profile 
they had been assigned to before completing the IC assessment: Group C, Group X, or 
no profile provided (i.e., what participants in the control condition should have 
responded, as they received no information regarding previous IC performance and 
were not assigned any profile group). 
 Next, participants answered 10 questions created to gauge their responses 
towards IC and their self-evaluations of their IC skills. Each of these questions fell into 
one of four categories: self-perceptions, future interest, perceptions of IC, and 
perceptions of feedback. Following each of the items, participants were given a sliding 
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bar scale that was anchored with “1” at the low end and “7” at the high end.  The 
specific items are described below. 
Self-perceptions: Participants were asked, “Overall, how good do you think your 
Integrational Complexity skills are?” with the sliding scale anchored by “poor” and 
“superb.” They were also asked, “When you think about your Integrational Complexity 
skills compared to other college students, where do you think your relative standing is?” 
with the sliding scale anchored by “a great deal worse than other college students” and 
“a great deal better than other college students.”  
Future interest: Participants were asked to, “Imagine that a course offered on 
campus was good at helping you improve your Integrational Complexity skills. How 
likely would you be to take that course?” with the sliding scale anchored with “a great 
deal less likely to take it” and “a great deal more likely to take it.” Participants were 
also asked, “Imagine that the university offered workshops designed to help students 
improve Integrational Complexity skills as part of a ‘college to career preparation 
program.’ How interested would you be in taking such a workshop?” with the sliding 
scale anchored with “not at all interested” and “very interested.”  
Perceptions of IC: Participants were asked three questions about their 
perceptions of IC. The first was “To what extent do you think you could improve your 
Integrational Complexity skills?” (with the sliding scale going from “I couldn’t improve 
them at all” and “I could improve them drastically”). They were also asked, “To what 
extent do you think your level of Integrational Complexity skill is something you are 
born with?” (with the sliding scale going from “not at all” to “entirely”) and “To what 
extent do you think your Integrational Complexity skills are important to your future 
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success both in college and your chosen career?” (sliding scale ranging from “not at all 
important” to “very important”).  
Perceptions of feedback: Participants were asked three questions about their 
perceptions of the IC feedback they received. These questions included “How positive 
was the feedback you received on your Integrational Complexity test performance?” 
(sliding scale ranging from “not at all positive” to “entirely positive”); “Do you think 
the feedback you received on your Integrational Complexity test performance is 
accurate of your actual skill level?” (sliding scale ranging from “not at all accurate” to 
“entirely accurate”); and “How much did the feedback you received on your 
Integrational Complexity test performance motivate you to improve your skills in the 
future?” (sliding scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”). 
A final, open-ended question asked, “Do you have any additional comments or 
concerns you'd like to share with us?” This was intended to allow participants to report 
any suspicions they had regarding the study. Three participants reported that IC 
probably was not real and that the study must be measuring something else. Two of 
these participants indicated that the optical illusion questions were what gave it away, 
and the third managed to ascertain that the average feedback was probably fake and 
given to all participants. Only two participants identified the false nature of the results. 
In total, the data of six participants were excluded based on their responses to this 
question. 
 After completing the dependent measures, participants were provided with a 
written debriefing form. It was explained to them that IC is not a real cognitive 
dimension, that the participant’s assigned cognitive profile was fabricated as a 
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manipulation in the study, and the IC assessment they took and the feedback they 
received were false. Participants were thanked for their time and asked not to talk about 
the purposes of the study with anyone. 
Results 
Self-Perception: 
The two items designed to assess Self-Perceptions were highly correlated (r=.52, 
p<.001), thus these items were averaged to form a composite. We hypothesized that the 
performance expectations would affect participants’ Self-Perceptions of their IC skills. 
To test this, we used analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to determine whether 
expectation condition (Excel v. Uncertain v. Control) and gender (Male v. Female) 
impacted Self-Perceptions, with GPA as a covariate in this analysis because GPA is a 
real measurement of student competence, and we wanted to ascertain that performance 
expectations would predict Self-Perceptions of IC above and beyond performance as a 
student.  
Consistent with our hypotheses, this analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of condition (F(2,438)= 3.96, p= 0.02). We used post-hoc comparisons to break down 
this omnibus effect. As displayed in Figure 1, the uncertain condition (M= 4.47, SD= 
0.78) reported significantly lower average scores than the excel condition (M= 4.72, 
SD= 0.75) on Self-Perceptions (p=0.003). The average score from the control group 
(M= 4.58, SD= 0.75) fell between the uncertain and excel conditions and was not 
significantly different from either. There was also a main effect of gender (see Figure 
1). On average, males (M= 4.91, SD= 0.85) reported more positive Self-Perceptions 
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than females (M= 4.46, SD= 0.70), F(1,439)= 34.44, p< 0.001. There was no interaction 
between gender and condition (F(2,438)= 0.03, p= 0.97). 
 
Figure 1. Self-perceptions of IC skills. This figure illustrates participants’ self-
perceptions of IC skills after receiving ambiguous feedback. 
Future Interest 
The two items designed to assess Future Interest were highly correlated (r=0.63, 
p<0.001), thus these items were averaged to form a composite. We hypothesized that 
performance expectations would affect participants’ Future Interest in IC. Those in the 
uncertain condition would report lower scores for Future Interest, while those in the 
excel condition would report higher. To test this, we used analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to determine whether expectation condition (Excel v. Uncertain v. Control) 
and gender (Male v. Female) impacted Future Interest. Future Interest was not 
significantly affected by either gender (F(1,439=0.39, p= 0.53) or condition 
(F(2,438)=0.72, p=0.49). Additionally, no interaction between gender and condition 
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was found (F(2,438)=0.013, p= 0.99). This suggests that all participants, regardless of 
gender and condition, responded similarly to the measures of Future Interest. 
Perceptions of Integrational Complexity: 
Out of the three items designed to measure Perceptions of IC, the two measuring 
Innateness and Improvability were not highly correlated (r= -0.03, p= 0.531), so they 
were analyzed separately. The third item was measuring something different—the 
importance of IC to Future Success—and was never intended for joint analysis. 
However, we predicted the same pattern of results for all three measures: Those in the 
uncertain condition would report lower scores for Perceptions of IC, while those in the 
excel condition would report higher. To test whether expectation condition (Excel v. 
Uncertain v. Control) and gender (Male v. Female) impacted Perceptions of IC, we ran 
separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on Improvability, Innate Ability, and Future 
Success. 
The analysis of Improvability revealed that neither gender (F(1,439)=3.53, p= 
0.23), nor the interaction of gender and condition (F(2,438)=0.37, p= 0.75) had an 
effect. However, Improvability was significantly affected by condition, F(2,438)= 3.53, 
p= 0.30. We used post-hoc comparisons to break down this omnibus effect. As 
displayed in Figure 2, the excel condition (M= 4.83, SD= 1.18) reported significantly 
lower average scores than the control condition (M= 5.32, SD= 1.05) on Improvability 
(p< 0.001). The average score from the uncertain condition (M= 5.03, SD= 1.11) 
trended towards significantly different from the control group (p= 0.053). Therefore, 
participants in both experimental conditions, but especially the excel condition, were 
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less likely to feel they could improve their Integrational Complexity skills compared to 
those in the control group. 
 
Figure 2. Improvability of IC skills. This figure illustrates how improvable participants 
felt their IC skills were after receiving ambiguous feedback. 
 Next, analysis revealed that neither gender (F(1,439)= 0.16, p=0.69) nor 
condition (F(2, 438)= 2.44, p= 0.09) had an effect on perceptions of Innate Ability. 
However, Innate Ability perceptions were significantly affected by the interaction of 
gender and condition (F(2, 438)= 4.22, p= 0.015). As displayed in Figure 3, in the 
uncertain condition women (M=3.57, SD=0.11) reported lower average scores than men 
(M=4.08, SD=0.17), but in the control condition women (M=3.76, SD=0.16) reported 
higher scores than men (M=3.29, SD=0.21), and in the excel condition women (M=3.83, 
SD=0.12) and men (M=3.95, SD=0.19) reported very similar scores. 
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Figure 3. Innateness of IC skills. This figure illustrates how innate participants felt their 
IC skills were after receiving ambiguous feedback. 
 Neither of the main effects nor the interaction were significant for the Future 
Success item. 
Perceptions of Feedback:  
We hypothesized that performance expectations would affect participants’ 
Perceptions of Feedback they received. Those in the uncertain condition would report 
lower scores for Perceptions of Feedback, while those in the excel condition would 
report higher. To test this, we used analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine whether 
expectation condition (Excel v. Uncertain v. Control) and gender (Male v. Female) 
impacted Perceptions of Feedback. The three Perceptions of Feedback items: Positivity, 
Accuracy, and Motivation were each analyzed individually because they addressed 
different aspects of participant’s perceptions of their feedback. 
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 The analysis of Positivity of IC feedback revealed that neither gender 
(F(1,439)=1.42, p= 0.24), condition (F(2,438)=0.39, p=0.68), nor the interaction 
between gender and condition (F(2,438)=1.20, p= 0.30) significantly affected Positivity. 
This suggests that participants, regardless of gender and condition, did not differ in their 
Positivity towards IC. 
 The analysis of Accuracy revealed that there was a main affect by gender. On 
average, women (M= 4.23, SD= 1.41) reported that the feedback was more accurate 
than did males (M=3.74, SD=1.46), F(1,439)= 9.64, p= 0.002 (see Figure 4). No effect 
was found for either condition (F(2,438)=0.08, p= 0.93) or the interaction between 
gender and condition (F(2,438)=0.002, p=1.00). 
 
Figure 4. Accuracy of IC skills. This figure illustrates how accurate participants felt 
their IC skills were after receiving ambiguous feedback. 
 The analysis of the Motivation item revealed that neither gender (F(1,439)=0.18, 
p= 0.67), condition (F(2,438)=0.06, p= 0.94), nor the interaction between gender and 
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condition (F(2,438)=0.06, p= 0.94) had a significant effect on how much the feedback 
affected participants’ motivation to improve their IC skills. This suggests that 
participants, regardless of gender and condition, reported similar scores on the measures 
of how feedback affected Motivation. 
Discussion 
Recall that we hypothesized that individuals made uncertain about their abilities 
in a domain would feel more negative towards the domain, while individuals led to 
believe that they would excel would feel more positive towards the domain—compared 
to those given no expectancies. Our results for self-perceptions of IC ability confirmed 
this hypothesis (Figure 1). Regardless of gender, participants told that they should 
expect to excel at IC reported more positive self-perceptions of their abilities even after 
their results indicated an average performance, while those made to feel uncertain 
reported less positive self-perceptions. 
In addition, while we hypothesized that men and women should respond 
similarly to the manipulation of their performance expectations (lowest for the uncertain 
condition and highest for the excel condition), we recognized that men and women 
could potentially differ overall in their responses to questions that addressed IC abilities 
(due to the tendency for women to respond more humbly). Consistent with this, self-
perceptions of IC skills were affected by the performance expectation, but across the 
board, men rated their self-perceptions of IC abilities significantly higher than did 
women. The results from the current study are consistent with previous research that 
shows men tend to report higher ratings of achievement than women (Felder et al., 
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1995). Our analyses of participants’ ratings of their feedback showed that women also 
felt the feedback they received to be significantly more accurate than did men.  
This combination of findings creates a troubling pattern. It seems that, compared 
to men, women both under-rate their performance and feel that ambiguous feedback is 
accurate. As discussed earlier, retention within STEM fields is largely dependent upon 
self-perceptions, and women feeling that they are merely average may not be enough to 
keep them in the field.  It seems likely that men feel their results under-represent their 
actual ability, considering that they reported lower scores for feedback accuracy and 
higher scores for self-perception than women. In fact, if men felt their feedback was 
inaccurately low, that could be the cause for their higher self-perception scores. Future 
work testing whether men’s accuracy ratings were driven by their belief that their scores 
were low would lend strength to this interpretation of the findings in the current study. 
 These two results—when combined—help paint a picture for why women leave 
STEM fields. The field presents them with an atmosphere that promotes feelings of 
uncertainty with regards to ability, and then, when presented with ambiguous feedback, 
they feel that this feedback is accurate. Most people do not strive for “average”, and 
when women receive this feedback, it is not surprising that they choose to pursue 
another vocation. For men in STEM, the situation is quite different. They do not face a 
compromising atmosphere; if anything, they are encouraged by societal stereotypes of 
men’s competence at math and science. When they do receive ambiguous feedback, 
they may dismiss it as inaccurate. 
 Another interesting set of results emerges when looking at how participants 
reacted to being given information about their skills before the assessment. People who 
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were given no information felt more capable of improving their IC skills than people 
who were given information—regardless of whether they were told that it was uncertain 
how they would perform or whether they were led to believe they would excel (Figure 
2). It seems that participants who were given a profile may have had their abilities 
anchored by these assigned profiles and thus felt there was less possibility to improve 
those skills. 
 These findings build upon previous research by Cimpian, Mu, and Erickson 
(2012) that addressed children’s task performance after being linked to a social group. 
They found that 4- to 7-year-olds who were told that “boys are good at this game” 
performed worse “regardless of whether the children themselves belonged to that 
group” (Cimpian et al., 2012). They hypothesized that this exposure to a stereotype led 
to the children adopting entity theories – that is, theories that skills in this domain are 
innate and fixed. Our results suggest that exposure to cognitive profiles may also lead to 
an adoption of entity theories, and can even do so for adults. 
 A similar pattern of results presented itself in the innate ability item, but only for 
men. Men who were given information about their abilities beforehand rated IC as 
being the result of innate talent much more than males who were not given any 
information about their abilities. It appears that men, by being assigned a cognitive 
profile, were led to believe that IC abilities were innate, whereas women were not. This 
strengthens a case for the formation of entity theories, but raises the question of why 
men and women would differ. Perhaps men feel that if a human quality can be 
measured (e.g. IQ), it is innate.  
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 We originally hypothesized that manipulating how participants’ felt about their 
abilities would affect how much future interest they held towards IC. While we didn’t 
confirm this hypothesis, we know based on previous literature that for women in 
STEM, the choice to remain within the field is dependent upon positive beliefs in one’s 
abilities (Hackett, 1985; Lent et al., 1986; Multon et al., 1991), and the current study 
shows that feeling uncertain about your abilities, and then receiving ambiguous 
feedback, will result in more negative self-perceptions within the domain. In addition, 
perhaps it should not surprise us that we found no results for future interest because this 
study was based around a single event, whereas underrepresented groups face these 
conditions on a continuous basis. 
 One potential limitation is that existing societal stereotypes could have affected 
the outcomes of this study, despite the fact that a new domain—Integrational 
Complexity—was created solely for the purpose of minimizing this potential. However, 
one of the largest components of IC was described as multitasking ability, which people 
correctly identify as favoring women (Stoet, 2013). If pre-existing stereotypes for this 
skill were to have affected this study, we should have seen women report higher scores 
in self-perception than men. 
Individuals uncertain of their abilities, after receiving ambiguous feedback, feel 
these abilities cannot be improved. Considering that participants made to feel uncertain 
about their abilities perceived their abilities as significantly lower than did those who 
were told they would excel, this result is concerning. Studies examining how to 
counteract these results would be of interest.  
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A similar study to the current one, but using multiple delivery methods to 
influence participants’ opinions regarding their abilities, instead of just cognitive 
profiles, could give insight into why individuals who were given information about their 
abilities (uncertain or positive), reacted differently to the improvability measures and, in 
the case of men, to measures of innate ability. The potential study’s manipulation would 
occur at the same time as it did in this study, but instead of varying cognitive profiles, it 
would vary the delivery method of information—cognitive profile would be just one of 
these conditions. For example, one condition could be the opinion from their academic 
advisor (e.g., “Based on your degree audit, your academic advisor (name) thinks you 
will perform well at IC”). Such a study could address the question of whether all forms 
of delivery affect people in the same way. We hypothesize that impersonal delivery 
methods (e.g. cognitive profiles and stereotypes) might feel outside of a participant’s 
control, and therefore would reduce perceptions of improvability further than more 
personal feedback methods (e.g. a teacher’s opinion). 
Our results showed that if people were led to believe they had strong abilities 
within a domain, they in turn felt more positive about their abilities after receiving 
ambiguous feedback. Conversely, if made to feel uncertain about their abilities, they 
perceived these abilities as low after seeing their feedback. Right now, atmospheres 
exist that make specific groups of people uncertain about their abilities (e.g. women in 
STEM fields). In order to give students and others the highest self-perceptions possible, 
procedures could be put in place to reassure individuals of their abilities before tests. 
Ideally, this would create a situation in which students with differing group 
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characteristics (race, gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation) would respond similarly 
to ambiguous feedback. 
 The fact that women—on average—underrate their performances compared to 
men, should be circulated. The simple act of spreading this knowledge could potentially 
assist women in reevaluating their abilities, and help college advisers or other 
professionals give relevant advice. As previously mentioned, the choice to pursue a 
vocation in STEM fields is mediated by beliefs in one’s ability (Hackett, 1985; Lent et 
al., 1986; Multon et al., 1991). If women are underestimating their STEM abilities, this 
may decrease their likelihood of continuing in STEM fields. An effective campaign 
promoting the gender differences in ability judgment could have a broad impact on self-
perceptions and a specific influence on retention rates of women in STEM. 
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Appendix 
 
 
This figure illustrates the ambiguous feedback given to all participants after their 
completion of the IC assessment. 
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Appendix ii 
 
Dependent Variable Grand Mean Standard Deviation 
Self-Perception 4.59 0.77 
Future-Interest 4.12 1.33 
Innate Ability 3.75 1.24 
Improvability 5.01 1.14 
Future Success 4.61 1.37 
Positivity 4.29 1.11 
Accuracy 4.09 1.44 
Motivation 3.91 1.53 
 
 Table 1. Dependent variable grand means and standard deviations. 
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